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THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST the continuing vitality of Roe v.
Wade' are characterizable as either natural law or positivist in tone. 2
Indeed the Roe decision itself, based as it is in the doctrine of
substantive due process, has been characterized as an example of
natural law reasoning, although those who defend it usually do so
in positivist terms.
Arguments for the overturning of the Roe decision can be grouped
into two categories: (1) the positivist argument that, contrary to the
assertions in the Roe decision,3 nothing in the Constitution protects
the right to privacy in the abortion decision (thus leaving legislatures
free to regulate the matter), and (2) the natural law argument that
a fetus or unborn child has a fundamental and inalienable right to
life (thus preventing legislatures from regulating the matter, except
for compelling governmental reasons). The right-to-life movement is
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Natural law jurisprudence suggests the existence of a higher law to which
all human law, whether in the form of legislation or case law, is subservient and
on which all human law depends for its validity. Natural law jurists purport to
discover this higher law in understandings of human nature itself. Natural law
jurisprudence has a history of a connection with religious views of law and justice.
See, e.g., Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, q. 90-97. In both its later and earlier
forms, however, natural law jurisprudence 'existed without reference to religious
doctrine. See Marcus Tullius Cicero, On the Commonwealth, Bk. Ill, ch. 13; and
Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis (1625). Positivist jurisprudence suggests that
law is confined to that which is posited or declared to be such by an authority
competent to do so. See Jeremy Bentham, An Jntroduction to the Principles of
Morals and Legislation (1780). In the context of the issues involved in Roe v. Wade,
a natural law approach would find the rights being discussed, whether the pregnant
woman's right to privacy in the abortion decision or the right to life of the. fetus
or unborn child, in higher-law-type understandings of humanness, without any
necessary reference to the Constitution, whereas a positivist approach would, for its
conclusions regarding those rights, rely on the concepts and principles which are
found in the Constitution, and would eschew any appeal to a higher-law concept.
3. Justice Blackmun, for the majority in Roe, located the right to privacy in
the abortion decision "in the fourteenth amendment's concept of personal liberty
and restrictions on state action." 410 U.S. 153 (1973).
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grounded upon the latter, natural law position. The difficulty for
the pro-life movement is that, if the Court decides to overrule Roe,
it will most likely do so using a positivist rather than a natural law
rationale.
Attempts have been made to cast a positivist gloss on the argument
that the fetus or unborn child has a right to life, usually by identifying
the right to life in question with the rights to life posited in the
language of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Those attempts,
however, have usually bogged down in question-begging circularity.
The fifth and fourteenth amendments' rights to life inure to "persons,"
and a fetus may or may not be a person, depending on the medical,
philosophical, or theological perspective one holds. The Roe Court
itself, noting the lack of a medical, philosophical, or theological
consensus on that issue, has declared that it (the Court) is not in a
position to impose an answer to that pivotal question as to when
human life begins, 4 but it has given a negative answer to the question
as to whether the fetus is a "person" in the constitutional sense.,
The Court's disinclination to come to grips with the question of
human life and its negative ruling on constitutional personhood6 have
been frustrating to those who oppose the Roe decision. Some, have
taken the critical natural law stance that if there is genuine doubt as
to whether a given entity is a human being or a person, any truly
civilized society would resolve that doubt in favor of humanness and
personhood rather than against them, lest the society find itself
approving of homicide. Others have taken the position that, by not
answering the question of when human life begins, the Court has
really answered it by positive inaction. In truth, however, the Court
had little to go on from a positivist perspective, except the
Constitution's confinement of the right to life to "persons" and the
common-law precedents which failed to grant personhood to fetuses
on any consistent and unequivocal basis.
7
The purpose of this article is to proffer the suggestions that the
question of human personhood in yet-to-be-born people has never
been unanswerable in terms of the text of the Constitution; that the
4. Ibid., p. 159. Elsewhere in the opinion, the Court took the position that
"person" as used in the text of the Constitution does not have any possible prenatal
application. Ibid., p. 157.
5. Ibid., p. 158.
6. Ibid.
7. The Court in Roe did, however, allow the obvious, i.e., that if constitutional
personhood were established, the fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed by
the fourteenth amendment. Ibid., p. 157.
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text of the Constitution itself indeed either posits the answer or
contains a criterion for positing the answer (an answer and a criterion
which were not considered in the Roe decision); and that the answer
posited is a pro-life answer, i.e., it is consistent with the proposition
that the Constitution can and perhaps should be interpreted in such
a way as to protect the right to life of fetuses or unborn children.
I. POSTERITY AND THE PREAMBLE
The textual reference will at first seem to the reader to be a modest
one. The reference is to the Preamble to the Constitution which, in
pertinent part, reads:
We the People of the United States, in Order to .. .secure the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and
establish this Constitution for the United States of America.'
A reference to the Preamble to the Constitution in the context of
the Roe decision is neither new nor original. Justice Douglas'
concurrence in Doe v. Bolton9 posited the "Blessings of Liberty"
clause in the Preamble as one of the textual locations of the right
to privacy in the abortion decision, and as the location of a far
broader right of privacy than was necessary to the Roe decision. 0
Douglas, however, used only a part of the clause. The full text of
the clause indicates that the entire Constitution was ordained and
established, inter alia, to secure the blessings of liberty to two classes
of people, i.e., "ourselves" and "our Posterity." The focus of this
article is on the word "Posterity," and the word "Posterity,"" it is
suggested, is difficult to define except in terms of yet-to-be-born
people. To put the matter quite simply, from a textualist perspective,
the conclusion seems inescapable that one of the purposes for the
establishment of our Constitution, identified as such in the Preamble,
is to secure the blessings of liberty to yet-to-be-born persons. 2
8. U.S. Constitution, Preamble.
9. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). Justice Douglas' concurrence in Doe also applies to
Roe. Ibid., p. 209.
10. Ibid., p. 209.
11. Webster's Third International Dictionary defines "posterity" as "the off-
spring of one progenitor to the furthest generation" or "descendants," and cites
and quotes the "blessings of liberty" clause in the Preamble to the Constitution as
its example. Webster's Third International Dictionary (1981), p. 1772.
12. At one point in his majority opinion in Roe, Justice Blackmun contended
that none of the usages of the word "person" in the Constitution indicates, with
any assurance, that the word has any possible prenatal application. 410 U.S. 113
(1973). Blackmun catalogued all the instances in which the word "person" is used
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It would be disingenuous in the extreme to suggest that the word
"Posterity" somehow refers exclusively to fetuses. Quite obviously
the framers intended the word to refer to the generations yet to
come, the descendants of the people of the United States of America
(and perhaps not even in an exclusively biological sense). In that
context, however, and even with that gloss of understanding, the
clause represents a textually specific indication that the Constitution
was intended, and presumably should be understood and interpreted,
to secure "Blessings of Liberty" to descendants as yet unborn. Indeed
it is not disingenuous to suggest that the Constitution places two
classes of people on a par in terms of entitlement to the "Blessings
of Liberty," i.e., "ourselves" and "our Posterity."
The word "posterity," by the year 1788, could be found in many
of the great documents founding and establishing the governments
of the new incipient states. The Preamble to the Massachusetts Bill
of Rights in 1780, for example, not only contained a "We . .. the
people" clause, but also recognized "the goodness of the great
Legislator of the universe" in affording the people an opportunity
"of forming a new constitution of civil government for ourselves
and posterity.' '1 3 Pennsylvania's Constitution of 1776, completed on
September 28, 1776, contained a similar reference to "posterity,"
announcing that "it is our indispensable duty to establish such
original principles of government, as will best promote the general
happiness of the people of this State, and their posterity. .... ,,. 4
The original and most helpful reference to "posterity" in the
context of the emerging independence movements, 5 however, came
in the Constitution, and made no reference to the Preamble because the word
"person" does not appear there (although the word "people" obviously does). The
position taken in this article is that the reference to "Posterity" in the Preamble
(not referred to by Justice Blackmun and apparently not considered by the Court
in Roe) necessarily casts a gloss of meaning on all the references to "person" and
"life" and "liberty" and similar usages in the main text of the Constitution, a gloss
that the Court has not yet taken into account in its past decisions.
13. The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic
Laws of the United States (Perley Poore, ed. 1877).
14. Ibid, p. 1541.
15. Earlier references to "posterity" in the context of fundamental rights move-
ments exist. The "Body of Liberties of the Massachusets Collonie in New England"
of 1641 contains an example:
We hould it ... our dutie and safetie whilst we are about the further establishing
of this Government to collect and expresse all such freedomes as for present
we foresee may concerne us, and our posteritie after us....
Quoted in The Founder's Constitution (Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner, eds.
1987), vol. 1, p. 428 [emphasis added].
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in June of 1776 in the Virginia Declaration of Rights. Drafted by
George Mason, who was later to become one of Virginia's delegates
to the Federal Constitutional Convention of 1787, the Virginia
Declaration of Rights proclaimed in its Preamble that the rights
declared in the purview of the instrument "do pertain to them (i.e.,
'the good people of Virginia') and their posterity, as the basis and
foundation of government."' 6 The first substantive clause of the
Declaration mentions "posterity" in strongly operative terms: "[A]II
men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain
rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot
by any compact deprive or divest their posterity; namely the enjoyment
of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing
property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety."' 7 The
emphasized language gains some importance when one realizes that
at the time the original body of the United States Constitution was
approved, there was no "Bill of Rights" in it, and thus the "Blessings
of Liberty" clause can only have been understood either in the
positivist context of the then extant state declarations and bills of
rights or in natural law understandings of the concept of liberty. If
the clause is understood in the positivist context, it is clear that at
least some of the state declarations and bills of rights gave the term
"posterity" genuine operative significance; e.g., under Virginia's
Declaration, posterity could not be divested of certain rights like the
rights to life and liberty.
II. Two ARGUMENTS AND A COROLLARY
Two arguments suggest themselves as a result of the analysis thus
far, one a somewhat aggressive argument, and the other a bit less
ambitious. The aggressive argument would be based on the fact that
the word "Posterity" includes (but, of course, is not limited to)
fetuses. That argument would go something like this. The "People
of the United States" in 1788, when they ordained and established
the Constitution, did so in order to secure the blessings of liberty to
their yet-to-be-born descendants. Their yet-to-be-born descendants
included those who were then in utero as well as the innumerable
generations yet to come into existence. Both classes of descendants
fit in under the term "Posterity." In this argument, the Preamble
clause is urged as a textually demonstrable indication that the
16. The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic
Laws of the United States, p. 1098.
17. Ibid. (emphasis added).
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Constitution was intended to secure "Blessings of Liberty" for
fetuses. Under this argument the full weight of the Preamble stands
behind the proposition that "Posterity" (in the form both of not-
yet-existent descendants and existent-but-not-yet-born descendants)
merits the "Blessings of Liberty." This argument is flawed, partly
because it proves too much (carried to its logical conclusion, it would
undo both Griswold's and EisenstadtI9-there is no textual reason
why the "Blessings of Liberty" do not inure to the yet-to-be-
conceived portion of "Posterity"), and partly because it gives direct
operative effect to the Preamble, and the Preamble, as we shall see
infra, cannot be used as an independent source of constitutional
rights and powers, but can only be used to elucidate those which do
appear in the purview of the Constitution.
The less ambitious argument would be less textualist or intentist
in scope, and would draw on the "spirit and reason" rule20 as well
as the more contemporary purposive, narrative, or "evolutionary"
models of legislative interpretation. 2' It would allow that the ordainers
and establishers of the Constitution might not have had the specific
problem of the right to life of existent-but-not-yet-born descendants
in mind, whether because abortion was not then a current issue or
because they simply intended a reference to future generations in a
generalized sense. Even under those hypotheses, however, the clause
is an indication that the ordainers and establishers wanted the
Constitution to be understood into the indefinite future to be as
much "Posterity" -oriented as "selves" -oriented .22
18. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
19. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
20. See generally Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
21. See William N. Eskridge and Philip P. Frickey, Cases and Materials on
Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy (1988), pp. 613-18; William
N. Eskridge and Philip P. Frickey, "Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reason-
ing," 42 Stan. L. Rev. (1990), p. 321; and Dennis M. Patterson, "Law's Pragmatism:
Law as Practice and Narrative," 76 Va. L. Rev. (1990), p. 937.
22. Justice Joseph Story, writing specifically about the "Blessings of Liberty to
ourselves and our Posterity" clause, observed that:
[Slurely no object could be more worthy of the wisdom and ambition of the
best men of any age. If there is any thing, which may justly challenge the
admiration of all mankind, it is that sublime patriotism, which looking beyond
its own times, and its own fleeting pursuits, aims to secure the permanent
happiness of posterity by laying the broad foundations of government upon
immovable principles of justice .... [Tihere is a noble disinterestedness in that
forecast, which disregards present objects for the sake of all mankind, and
erects structures to protect, support, and bless the most distant generations.
Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (abridged ed.
1833), p. 189.
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Under this analysis, admittedly less ambitious than the former, the
Court, when faced with an interpretive question which could be
resolved in a way in which the concept of "Posterity" is (1) taken
positively and protectively into account, that is, an interpretation
which is posterity-oriented, at least in part, or (2) ignored or treated
negatively, would in light of the "Blessings of Liberty" clause
ordinarily choose the former. This argument is more negative than
positive in its casting, stressing only that interpretations which ignore
or treat negatively the interests of "Posterity," or which fail to put
"Posterity" on the same level as "selves," are very likely not in
accord with the spirit of the Constitution. It does not suggest that
"Posterity" has some affirmative claim to rights or entitlements. As
applied to the Roe decision, however, the argument carries some
force. In Roe the Court was faced with at least two plausible choices, 23
one of which-extending fourteenth-amendment right-to-life coverage
to fetuses-was posterity-oriented in that it would have taken the
interests of a portion of posterity positively and protectively into
account, and the other of which-withholding fourteenth-amendment
right-to-life coverage from fetuses-could hardly be said to be
posterity-oriented or even to put "Posterity" on the same level as
"selves," in that it recognized no protectable interests of the portion
of posterity in question (it did, however, recognize an interest of the
government in potential human life). The Court chose that latter
interpretation, and in doing so (so the argument would go) was not
in accord with the spirit of the Constitution as informed by the
"Blessings of Liberty to . . . our Posterity" clause.
A corollary to this second argument would be that a legislature
which chooses to protect potential human life from the moment of
conception can hardly be said to be acting against the spirit of the
Constitution as that spirit is informed by the "Blessings of Liberty
to . . . our Posterity" clause.
Both arguments and the corollary lead inexorably to a clash
between two of the phrases in the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause, i.e., the right to liberty, which may well include a
right to privacy in the abortion decision in the abstract, and the right
to life, which according to a reading of the spirit of the Constitution
23. A third choice was to leave the matter to the legislatures, but that choice is
not relevant to the perspective being explored in this article. In that context, however,
choosing to leave the matter to the legislatures would amount merely to a post-
ponement of the interpretive problem. The constitutionality of the legislatures' work
products, be they pro-life, pro-choice, or something in between, would still have to
be assessed in light of the blessings-of-liberty and right-to-life clauses.
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informed by the "Blessings of Liberty to . . our Posterity" clause
may well include a right of an unborn yet nonetheless extant unit of
posterity to enter the outer world so that she can enjoy those
blessings. 24 In the strongest understanding of this clash, the right to
life must always trump the right to liberty and can only be undone
if the right to liberty in the equation also happens to amount to a
right to life, i.e., if the continued life of the fetus is a genuine threat
to the life of the pregnant woman. The principle of self-defense in
the context of a genuine threat to one's life would alone justify the
taking of the fetus' life. Weaker understandings are certainly possible.
Quality-of-life considerations can be let into the balance, but only at
the risk of turning the "Blessings of Liberty to . . . our Posterity"
clause into a contentless derelict in the text of the Preamble. What
seems evident is that the "Blessings of Liberty to . . . our Posterity"
clause identifies us as a people who profess a caring attitude toward
our descendants to the point of announcing formally and solemnly
that the fundamental document of our structured self-government
was ordained and established for their weal as well as ours, and so
that they may enjoy what we enjoy.
III. THE AUTHORITY OF THE PREAMBLE
One might expect that not much has been written about the
Preamble of the United States Constitution, and even less about the
"Blessings of Liberty" clause, and those suspicions would not be-far
off the mark. The "Blessings of Liberty" clause has, however,
received fairly recent comment in Justice Douglas' concurrence in
Doe v. Bolton.25 Apart from Douglas' reference, Justice Harlan
referred to the clause in Jacobson v. Massachusetts:
Although . . . one of the declared objects of the Constitution was
to secure the blessings of liberty to all under the sovereign juris-
diction and authority of the United States, no power can be exerted
to that end by the United States unless, apart from the Preamble,
24. The more aggressive argument would position that right to life in the
"Blessings of Liberty to . . . our Posterity" clause itself. The less aggressive argument
would position it in the "right to life" clauses and would only use the "Blessings
of Liberty to . . . our Posterity" clause as an interpretive aid, identifying the spirit
and reason behind the Constitution's recognition of the right to life as being as
much "Posterity" -oriented as "selves" -oriented.
25. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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it be found in some express delegation of power or in some power
to be properly implied therefrom. 1 Story's Const. sec. 462.26
Justice Harlan's reference to Joseph Story's Commentaries on the
Constitution of the United States underscores the basic principle that
the Preamble may not be referred to in order to enlarge the powers
given in the purview of the instrument, but that it is permissible to
use the Preamble to discover the object or purpose of the framers:
It is an admitted maxim in the ordinary course of the administra-
tion of justice, that the Preamble of a statute is a key to open
the mind of the makers, as to the mischiefs, which are to be
remedied, and the objects, which are to be accomplished by the
provisions of the statute .... There does not seem any reason,
why, in a fundamental law or constitution of government, an
equal attention should not be given to the intention of the framers,
as stated in the Preamble.
27
The example chosen by Justice Story to illustrate this principle,
although not in the context of the "Blessings of Liberty" clause, is
instructive:
For example, the Preamble declares one object to be, "to provide
for the common defence." ... [S]uppose the terms of a given
power admit of two constructions the one more restrictive, the
other more liberal, and each of them is consistent with the words,
but is, and ought to be, governed by the intent of the power; if
one would promote, and the other defeat the common defence,
ought not the former, upon the soundest principles of interpreta-
tion to be adopted? Are we at liberty, upon any principles of
reason, or common sense, to adopt a restrictive meaning, which
will defeat an avowed object of the constitution, when another
equally natural, and more appropriate to the object, is before us?
26. 197 U.S. 11, 22 (1905). Various aspects of the Preamble are discussed in
other decisions of the United States Supreme Court. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) 471 (1793); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 324 (1816);
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 403 (1819); Barron v. Baltimore, 32
U.S. (7 Pet.) 247 (1833); Leggue v. DeYoung, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 203 (1850); Texas
v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 724 (1869); Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 554
(1871); White v. Hart, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 650 (1872); United States v. Cruikshank,
92 U.S. 542 (1876); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 369 (1886); Geofroy v. Riggs,
133 U.S. 258 (1890); In re Ross, 140 U.S. 464 (1891); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S.
1 (1901); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901); Dooley v. United States,
182 U.S. 236 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 270 (1901); Ponce v. Roman
Catholic Apostolic Church, Porto Rico, 210 U.S. 296 (1908); and Ochoa v. Morales,
230 U.S. 139 (1913). The Jacobson case, however, is the one which contains the
major pronouncements on the "Blessings of Liberty" clause and on the interpretive
principle with respect to the Preamble.
27. Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, sec. 218, 219.
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Would not this be to destroy an instrument by a measure of its
words, which that instrument itself repudiates?28
If it is fair to paraphrase Justice Story's analysis and apply it to
the "Blessings of Liberty" clause, one might argue the following.
Suppose that the provisions in the Constitution recognizing a right
to life admit of two constructions, the one more restrictive, the other
more. liberal, and each of them is consistent with the words, but is,
and ought to be, governed by the intent of those provisions; if one
would secure, and the other defeat the securing of the blessings of
liberty to our posterity, ought not the former, upon the soundest
principles of interpretation to be adopted?
The question remains as to whether Story's principle of interpretation
with respect to Preambles is indeed sound. Story himself, at one
point, referred to the Preamble somewhat sanguinely as "very
important, not only as explanatory of the motives and objects of
framing the Constitution; but as affording the best key to the
interpretation thereof." '29 A contemporary constitutional scholar,
however, while not inconsistent with Story, is somewhat less sanguine:
The Preamble to the Constitution of the United States illuminates
the objects of the Framers and, thus, can be a guide to construc-
tion, but it is not considered to confer powers or right.3 0
In truth, the law of legislative interpretation has given Preambles a
mixed reception. The early English cases gave them great weight for
statutory interpretation purposes. 3 The idea that Preambles ought to
be used only to explicate, and not as a source of positive powers,
seems to have entered our jurisprudence in the eighteenth century.1
2
That limitation is what brought the law on Preambles to its present
state, recognizing them as useful in identifying the spirit and reason
behind a particular piece of legislation, but not as conferring positive
rights or powers.
[I]t is to the Preamble more especially that we look for the reason,
or spirit, of every statute; rehearsing, . . . as it ordinarily does,
28. Ibid., sec. 221 (emphasis added). The quote here is from the abridged version
of Story's Commentaries. It is not without significance to note that the section
referred to here is, in the differently numbered unabridged version, section 462, i.e.,
the section cited by Justice Harlan in the Jacobson case. See ibid., conversion table,
p. xxxvii.
29. Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, p. 37, 38 (emphasis
added).
30. Chester James Antieu, Constitutional Construction (1982), p. 31.
31. See Stowel v. Lord Zouch, 1 Plowd. 353, 369, 75 Eng. Rep. 536 (C.B.
1569).
32. See Copeman v. Gallant, 1 P. Wins. 314, 24 Eng. Rep. 404 (Ch. 1716).
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.* . in ihe best and most satisfactory manner, the object or
intention of the legislature.33
The lesson from the case law on Preambles in general seems to be
that Preambles are of limited use in legislative interpretation. They
are not ordinarily regarded as controlling when they contradict the
purview of the text, and they cannot be looked to as sources of
rights or powers independent of those specified in the purview, but
in cases of doubt, where there is ambiguity or uncertainty in the
purview proper, they can be resorted to as aids in discovering the
spirit and reason behind the rule or principle in question.
3 4
In light of the case law on Preambles in general and on the
Preamble to the Constitution of the United States in particular, it
would seem that some limited use may be made of the "Blessings
of Liberty to .'. . our Posterity" clause in shedding light on the
spirit behind the fifth and fourteenth amendments' rights to life and
liberty.35 In that context, some understanding of the "legislative
history" behind the Preamble and the "Blessings of Liberty" clause
would seem to be relevant.
33. Brett v. Brett, 3 Add. 210, 216, 162 Eng. Rep. 456 (Ch. 1716).
34. See generally Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th ed. 1984), vol. 2A,
sec. 47.04, pp. 126-31. There has been some sentiment to the contrary in the history
of Congress' treatment of the Preamble. In the debates over amending the Consti-
tution to insert a bill of rights, in August of 1789, a proposal was introduced to
insert, before "We the People" in the Preamble the words "Government being
intended for the benefit of the people and the rightful establishment thereof being
derived from their authority alone." The proposal, of course, was eventually rejected,
but during the debates, Thomas Tudor Tucker, the representative from South
Carolina, argued that the Preamble "was no part of the Constitution," but others,
notably, Roger Sherman of Connecticut, argued that the amendment was unnecessary
because the "We the People" language already expressed its principle. Tucker's
statement was, at best, an understatement of the authoritativeness of preambles,
even in the case law of his day. Sherman and those who agreed with him, in any
case, took a position that did give operative effect to the Preamble. See Creating
the Bill of Rights: The Documentary Record from the First Federal Congress (Helen
E. Veit et al, eds. 1991), p. 129.
35. It is, of course, a fact that neither the fifth amendment's nor the fourteenth
amendment's right-to-life clause was in the Constitution at the time of its adoption,
but the amendatory process itself was laid out in the original text, and thus it would
be disingenuous to suggest that the Preamble expresses the spirit and reason behind
the original body of the document, but not the spirit and reason behind later
amendments, unless, of course, the later amendment can be understood as abrogating
expressly or impliedly something in the original text. Also, as we shall see, the
legislative history of the "Blessings of Liberty" clause reveals that it is tied in with
the declarations or bills of rights in the various state constitutions, including, of
course, their specific guarantees of rights to life and liberty.
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IV. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PREAMBLE
The "Blessings of Liberty" clause, it may come as a surprise to
some, was not in any of the early drafts of the Constitution during
the Convention of 1787. In fact, it entered very late in the proceedings,
in mid-September of 1787, just a few days before the final version
of the Constitution was signed by the delegates and sent to the state
ratifying conventions. As of September 10, 1787, the Convention
had all but agreed on a final text of the Constitution when a motion
was passed to appoint a committee "to revise the stile of and arrange
the articles which had been agreed to by the house." '3 6 The Preamble
to the version of the draft Constitution that was referred to this
Committee of Style did mention the world "Posterity," but contained
no "Blessings of Liberty" clause:
We the people of the States of New-Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New-York,
New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North-
Carolina, South-Carolina, and Georgia, do ordain, declare and
establish the following Constitution for the government of our-
selves and our Posterity.
7
Four days later, on September 12, 1787, the Committee of Style
reported on its work, and presented the Convention with the text of
the Constitution in virtually the form in which we see it today
(without the Bill of Rights and the later amendments, of course),
with its present Preamble. 8 The convention adopted the Constitution
five days later.
36. The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (Max Farrand, ed. 1937),
vol. 2, p. 553.
37. Ibid., p. 565. Nott has suggested that the version quoted here was the work
of Charles Pinckney, the delegate from South Carolina, and was derived from the
Constitution of Massachusetts. Charles C. Nott, The Mystery of the Pinckney
Draught (1908), p. 167, 169. The version quoted here was actually agreed to without
debate by the Convention on August 7, 1787. See The Records of the Federal
Convention of 1787, vol. 2, p. 209; and Documents Illustrative of the Formation
of the Union of the American States (Charles C. Tansill, ed. 1927), p. 482. Elliot
reports that "[oin the question to agree to the preamble to the Constitution as
reported from the committee [of detail] to whom were referred the proceedings of
the Convention, it passed unanimously in the affirmative." The Debates in the
Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution as Recom-
mended by the General Convention at Philadelphia in 1787 Together with the
Journal of the Federal Convention (Jonathan Elliot, ed. 1836), pp. 230, 231.
38. Van Doren has referred to the present Preamble as "Itlhe most striking
addition made by the Committee of Style." Carl Van Doren, The Great Rehearsal:
The Story of the Making and Ratifying of the Constitution of the United States
(1948), p. 160.
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It is generally acknowledged that the individual author of the
Committee of Style's new Preamble (the one that we see today in
the Constitution) was Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania.39 Morris
undoubtedly would have been familiar with the Constitution of
Pennsylvania of 1776 which, in its Preamble, mentions "posterity"
and, in its declaration of rights, mentions "the blessings of 'liberty":
[I]t is our indispensable duty to establish such original principles
of government, as will best promote the general happiness of the
people of this state, and their posterity .... A frequent recurrence
to fundamental principles, and a firm adherence to justice, mod-
eration, temperance, industry, and frugality are absolutely neces-
sary to preserve the blessings of liberty, and keep a government
free. . .4
Morris may or may not have drawn on the language of his home
state's constitution in drafting the Preamble to the United States
Constitution, but the more interesting question is why he chose to
make any alteration at all in the Committee of Detail's Preamble,
especially in view of the fact that that version of the Preamble had
been voted on and already approved by the Convention.
The history of what happened in the Committee of Style during
the four days in which it worked on and revised the text of the
Constitution is not well recorded, and with respect to the changes in
the wording of the Preamble, even less well recorded. One is left
with surmises and inferences drawn mainly from records of reactions
of various delegates to the Committee's final draft on the floor of
the Convention and afterwards. Perhaps the most strident of the
reactions to the change in the wording of the Preamble came from
Luther Martin, the delegate from Maryland, in an article in the
Maryland Gazette on June 3, 1788, nearly a year after the deed had
been done. Martin still felt strongly enough to juxtapose the two
versions of the Preamble (the one in the draft submitted to the
Committee of Style and the one reported out by that committee) and
to accuse the committee of trying to destroy the several state
governments (Martin, of course, was not a signatory to the
Constitution and argued against its approval):
As altered, every appearance of the existing governments, under
their respective Constitutions, is relinquished, the very names
struck out, general purposes and powers given extending to every
39. See The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. 170, 420, 499.
40. The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic
Laws of the United States, pp. 1541, 1542 (emphasis added).
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purpose of the social compact, and then this Constitution including
all these purposes, is made the Constitution of the United States,
without any reserve of the several States or their Constitutions
then existing, and then this Constitution enacted for these unlimited
purposes, we afterwards find is expressly declared paramount to
all Constitutions, and laws existing in the States.
4'
It seems probable that Luther Martin regarded all the clauses of
the present Preamble as amounting together to something like a
national bill of rights preempting of all the states' declarations and
bills of rights, when he wrote of the Preamble's "general purposes
and powers . . . extending to every purpose of the social compact,"
i.e., every reason why people form governments, and tied that
reference in with a latent reference to the Supremacy Clause.
Elsewhere, however, Martin wrote of the need of a national bill of
rights "prefixed to the Constitution." 42 It may be that his objection
was as to the overgenerality of the principles mentioned in the present
Preamble, and that what he would really have liked to have seen, if
state declarations and bills of rights were to be preempted, was a
Preamble that contained a detailed listing of basic rights. That
argument may, however, be difficult to square with his expressed
outrage at the perceived destruction of states' sovereignty.
The objection that the Constitution, because of its Supremacy
Clause, would render nugatory all states' bills of rights or at least
would represent a threat of doing so was well known. George Mason,
the delegate from Virginia, had made the point on the floor of the
Convention several times. In fact, the last time he maneuvered for
the insertion of a national bill of rights into the Constitution was
on September 12, 1789, the very day on which the Convention was
considering the work product of the Committee of Style.43 The debate
records are, of course, sketchy at best, and one wonders how it was
that the delegates were persuaded to oppose Mason's bill-of-rights
maneuver. What can be pieced together from the records is that
Mason raised the point that a bill of rights could be prepared in a
few hours and suggested that if anyone were to move to require one
to be inserted in the Constitution, he would second the motion.
Elbridge Gerry took the hint and made the motion. Mason seconded
it. Roger Sherman of Connecticut, however, pointed out that the
41. Supplement to Max Farrand's The Records of the Federal Convention of
1787) (James H. Hutson, ed. 1987), pp. 291, 292.
42. The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, vol. 3, p. 290 (in a letter
to Oliver Ellsworth, dated March 19, 1788) (emphasis added).
43. Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 587, 588.
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state declarations of rights are not repealed by the Constitution, and
they could be trusted to do all that a national bill of rights would
do. Mason countered with his Supremacy Clause argument, i.e., that
national laws were declared to be paramount over state laws,
presumably including state bills of rights. Sherman's argument won
the day, however, as Gerry's motion was unanimously defeated (the
voting, of course, was by states, not by individual delegates)."
Mason's Supremacy Clause argument seems quite strong, and one
looks in vain in the records of the debates for a rebuttal. Yet there
must have been one. The only recorded opposition remark was Roger
Sherman's seemingly lame assertion that "the State Declarations of
Rights are not repealed by the constitution. ' 4 More in the way of
an explanation must have been given, and indeed the "unanimous"
rejection of Gerry's and Mason's motion is not the whole story;
there is a mystery connected with the incident-there may have been
two votes on the question.4 What seems certain, if only because of
the mysterious anomaly in the differing reports of the votes on the
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid., p. 588.
46. All the records are not in agreement that Gerry and Mason's motion to add
a bill of rights to the final version of the Constitution was rejected unanimously.
Bancroft has noted that manuscripts and printed texts of the records of the
Convention "differ in an astonishing manner." The manuscript version of the
Convention's Journal merely reports that the motion "passed in the negative,"
without indicating unanimity. James Madison's manuscript notes record a vote of
10 aye, 0 nay, and 1 abstention. Yet at least two printed versions of the convention's
proceedings record the vote as follows:
On the question for a committee to prepare a bill of rights-New Hampshire,
Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, aye-5; Maryland, Virginia,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no-5; Massachusetts, absent.
Bancroft refers to the anomalous reports as a "change," and indicates that "[t]he
change as yet remains a mystery." George Bancroft, History of the Formation of
the Constitution of the United States of America (3rd ed. 1883), vol. 2, p. 209. See
also Journal of the Constitutional Convention Kept by James Madison (E.H. Scott,
ed. 1893), p. 717. Scott's edition of Madison's journal not only reports the 5 aye,
5 nay, 1 absent vote, but also has George Mason arguing that "a general principle
* . .would be sufficient . . .and with the aid of the State Declarations, a bill might
be prepared in a few hours." Ibid. It does not seem inconceivable, in light of the
anomalies in the journals and records, that there were two votes: the tie vote,
defeating the motion, of course, but also representing the accurate viewpoints of
the delegations concerning the need for a bill or declaration of rights, and then, in
the aftermath of the tie vote, someone, probably Roger Sherman (the leader of the
opposition to the motion) or Gouverneur Morris (the drafter of the new preamble),
pointing out the existence of the "Blessings of Liberty" clause and its potential
operative effect as a guarantor of the state declaration of rights, and then the second
vote unanimously rejecting the motion to prepare a bill of rights.
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bill-of-rights question is that the records do not tell us all that
happened, and we are left with the necessity to surmise and infer.
The question involved in the Mason bill-of-rights controversy was
as to how the state declarations of rights could be considered secure
in view of the Supremacy Clause's assertion that the laws of the
United States made pursuant to the Constitution were the supreme
law of the land, anything in the Constitution or laws of any state
notwithstanding. 4 The records of the debates on the floor of the
Convention, being too sketchy to be useful on the point, leave one
with the uneasy feeling that there must have been some unrecorded
explanation, perhaps hidden in the simple summary of Delegate
Sherman's assertion that the state declarations of rights are not
repealed by the Constitution. What in the Constitution itself would
support the conclusion that the state bills of rights are not threatened
by the Supremacy Clause? The clue may be in the newly revised
Preamble inserted by the Committee of Style. The new references to
establishing justice, promoting the general welfare, and especially
securing the blessings of liberty are references that are usually found
in the bodies of bills or declarations of rights. It is not difficult to
reconstruct the argument that the state bills or declarations of rights
are not undone or threatened by anything in the new national
Constitution because the new national Constitution unambiguously
proclaims that its purpose is to secure the blessings of liberty, and
not to curtail them. On this line of reasoning, the purpose of the
"Blessings of Liberty" clause was to serve as an operative buffer
preventing the Constitution from being interpreted in such a way as
to affect adversely any basic rights of humankind, or at least those
basic rights that were then secured by state bills of rights, the point
being that the clause itself was intended from the beginning to have
operative effect as a tool of constitutional interpretation.
48
47. U.S. Constitution, Article VI.
48. Alexander Hamilton seemed to see the "Blessings of Liberty" clause in this
light, i.e., as a guarantor of the liberties established in states; bills of rights, and
even perhaps as constituting a national bill of rights all by itself.
Here, in strictness, the people surrender nothing, and as they retain everything,
they have no need of particular reservations. "We the people of the United
States, to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do
ordain and establish this constitution for the United States of America" (sic).
Here is a better recognition of popular rights than volumes of those aphorisms
which make the principal figure in several of our state bills of rights, and which
would sound much better in a treatise of ethics than in a constitution of
government.
... [Bills of rights, in the sense and in the extent in which they are contended
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George Mason never abandoned his Supremacy Clause objection
to the Constitution and, of course, history records that he refused
to sign it on that and several other grounds.49 What is, perhaps,
meaningful in the context of this thesis that the "Blessings of
Liberty" clause in the Preamble might have been intended as a
response to Mason's incessant argument that the Constitution
threatened states' bills of rights is that on the day after Mason had
voiced his strenuous objection he presented to the Convention a list
of some nineteen suggested revisions of the Committee of Style's
version of the Constitution. Not included in the list was a suggestion
of the need for a bill of rights. 0 The suggestion was renewed on
September 15, two days later, however." Whether the "Blessings of
Liberty" clause argument, if indeed it was ever made, gave Mason
two days' pause in his thoughts on the point is not, of course,
recorded. It is evident that the argument (again, if it was ever made)
did not allay Mason's concern for long.
There is some evidence, however, that Mason did, indeed, vacillate
in his opposition to the Constitution. George Nicholas recounted the
incident in a letter to James Madison, dated April 5, 1788:
Mr. Mason ... declared that, notwithstanding his objections to
particular parts of the plan, he would take it as it was rather than
lose it altogether; since that I have reason to believe his sentiments
are much changed which I attribute to two causes: first the
irritation he feels from the hard things that have been said of
him, and secondly to the vain opinion he entertains . .. that he
has influence enough to dictate a constitution to Virginia, and
through her to the rest of the Union. 2
It will be remembered that Mason was the author of the Virginia
Declaration of Rights, mentioned earlier." If Mason was, indeed,
trying to get the Convention to adopt a Virginia-type Declaration of
Rights for the United States Constitution, and if the Committee of
Style put the clause about securing the blessings of liberty to ourselves
and our posterity into the Preamble in a last minute (albeit eventually
for, are . . . unnecessary in the proposed constitution. ....
Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 84 (Jacob E. Cooke, ed. 1961), pp. 578,
579.
49. The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. 636-40.
50. Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 269-71.
51. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 637.
52. Ibid., vol. 3, p. 296.
53. The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic
Laws of the United States, p. 1098.
290 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF JURISPRUDENCE (1993)
unsuccessful) effort to gain Mason's support for the final version of
the document, as seems likely, then there would seem to be some
connection, in the context of legislative history, between the "Blessings
of Liberty" clause and the Virginia Declaration of Rights. It will be
remembered that the Virginia Declaration of Rights, antedating the
Declaration of Independence by a month in 1776, contained perhaps
the original reference to "posterity" in the context of the governmental
documents that were emerging from the freedom movements in the
colonies-becoming-states. The references to "posterity" in the Virginia
Declaration are particularly strong:
A Declaration of Rights made by the Representatives of the good
people of Virginia, assembled in full and free convention; which
rights do pertain to them and their posterity, as the basis and
foundation of Government.
1. That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and
have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state
of society, they cannot, by any compact deprive or divest their
posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the
means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and
containing happiness and safety.54
If the Virginia Declaration of Rights did inform and influence the
Committee of Style in the drafting of the Preamble to the Constitution
of the United States,5 then it would seem appropriate to look to the
Virginia Declaration for an understanding of the operative force of
the use of the term "Posterity." According to the Virginia Declaration,
rights to the enjoyment of life and liberty cannot be ceded to society,
nor can persons cede those rights on behalf of their posterity. The
rights to life and liberty are, in the words of the Declaration of
Independence, "unalienable." The meaning is the same. They cannot
be alienated or conveyed away to the state or to anyone else, and
this inalienability applies not only to our own basic rights, but also
54. The Virginia Declaration of Rights, as agreed to by the Virginia Convention
on June 12, 1776; reproduced in The George Mason Lectures: Honoring the Two
Hundredth Anniversary of the Virginia Declaration of Rights (1976), appendix 20
(emphasis added). See also The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters,
and Other Organic Laws of the United States, p. 957.
55. It is not doubted that some of the immediate verbiage of the Preamble was
taken from Article III of the old Articles of Confederation, which has the states
entering into a "firm league of friendship with each other, for their common
defence, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and general welfare," but
the Constitution's Preamble so clearly speaks to people's rights, and specifically not
states' rights, that the conceptual antecedent cannot possibly be in the Articles of
Confederation. The Articles, because they had no occasion to do so, did not mention
"posterity."
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to those of our posterity. Moreover, the basic rights enumerated in
virtually all bills or declarations of rights invariably include rights to
life and liberty.
V. POSTERITY AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY
It has not been the purpose of this article to make the case for a
philosophical grounding of society's duty towards its "posterity."
The case from philosophy would amount to a natural-law-type
argument. This article is confined to a positivist approach, pointing
to the acceptance, by the framers of the Constitution and by the
people who accepted it as their fundamental law, of a purpose of
securing the blessings of liberty to their descendants on into the
indefinite future, i.e., an acceptance of the proposition that the
Constitution is to be interpreted in a posterity-oriented manner. It is
one thing, however, to make the case that the Framers and our
constitutional ancestors had that intent, but it is another thing to
demonstrate that that intent is consistent, or at least not inconsistent,
with moral theory. Interpretive principles, however, consistent they
may be with original intent, are suspect in the minds of many if
they are inconsistent with moral theory.
To some it may seem obvious, perhaps self-evident, that an extant
generation, acting as a society, has a moral duty to care about, or
at least to avoid harming, the interests of succeeding generations.
6
The parent-child analogy raised to the generalized level of society
would seem compelling. The case should, perhaps, nonetheless be
made.
One who has made such a case is John Rawls. Rawls, a moral
philosopher of the contractarian and Kantian (therefore rationalist)
school, posited the now famous veil-of-ignorance device as part of
his original-position analysis of justice and its fundamental precepts.
Rawls' idea is that the fundamental principles of justice which are
to govern a society can be arrived at by hypothesizing a group of
original "justice seekers" who are motivated by a rational self-interest
56. Christopher Lasch observed, a decade ago, that:
we are fast losing the sense of historical continuity, the sense of belonging to
a succession of generations originating in the past and stretching into the
future[,] and that we are now experiencing an "erosion of any strong concern
for posterity."
Christopher Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism (1979), p. 30, cited and quoted in R.
George Wright, "The Interests of Posterity in the Constitutional Scheme," 59 U.
Cin. L. Rev. (1990), pp. 113, 125.
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in trying to come up with the fundamental principles which will
govern them as a society, but who are also under a "veil of
ignorance" -none of them knows his or her place in society, social
status, or personal attributes, i.e., the factors which lead to inequality
or favoritism, and therefore to injustice. 7 The result should be a
rationally arrived at and realistic set of general precepts of justice.
One of the factors which Rawls specifies as being occluded by the
veil of ignorance in this scheme is one's generational identity: "The
persons in the original position have no information as to which
generation they belong. '5 8 In this way, it is thought, no principle of
justice will come into being which is unfair to succeeding generations.
It is a way of arriving at intergenerational justice. None of the justice
seekers in the "original position" will be likely to posit an
understanding of justice which will be unfair to future generations
because the hypothetical justice seeker does not know whether he or
she (gender too is unknown) might be a member of the future
generation. Rawls explains, in the context of immediately succeeding
generations:
The question arises .. .whether persons in the original position
have obligations and duties to third parties, for example, to their
immediate descendants. To say that they do would be one way of
handling questions of justice between generations. However, the
aim of justice as fairness is to derive all duties and obligations
from other conditions, so this way out should be avoided....
What is essential is that each person in the original position should
care about the well-being of some of those in the next generation,
it being presumed that their concern is for different individuals in
each case. Moreover for anyone in the next generation, there is
someone who cares about him in the present generation. Thus the
interests of all are looked after and, given the veil of ignorance,
the whole strand is tied together.5 9
57. One might surmise that Rawls took a clue from Rousseau, who defined a
nation's ideal "lawgiver" as:
a superior intelligence, who could understand the passions of men without
feeling any of them, who has no affinity with our nature but knew it to the
full, whose happiness was independent of ours, and who would nevertheless
make our happiness his concern, who would be content to wait in the fullness
of time for a distant glory, and to labor in one age to enjoy the fruits of
another.
Jean Jacques -Rousseau, The Social Contract (M. Cranston, trans. 1968) p. 84.
Rawls had other precursors as well. See Raymond B. Marcin, "Justice and Love,"
33 Cath. U. L. Rev. (1984), pp. 363, 372-82.
58. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971), p. 137.
59. Ibid., pp. 128, 129.
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In Rawls' scheme of things, one generation does not have a direct
obligation or duty to its immediate descendants. The idea of a direct
obligation or duty would lead to endless arguments over the content
of the obligation or duty. The duty or obligation is derived indirectly
through the use of the original-position device. The end result seems
to be an inter-generational "golden rule"; we must do unto the next
generation as we would do unto ourselves. Just as the biblical golden
rule specifies no particular content, yet seems to be bursting with
self-evident meaning and operative significance, so too does this
intergenerational application of the original-position methodology of
Rawls seems to lead inexorably to a forward-looking and progressively
protective attitude towards posterity.
Just as, in this article, a relatively modest claim has been advanced
with respect to the interpretation of the "Blessings of Liberty to . . .
our Posterity" clause in the Preamble, so too Rawls' application of
the original-position methodology to future generations is relatively
modest in scope.
[T]he original position is not to be thought of as a general assembly
which includes at one moment everyone who will live at some
time; or, much less, an assembly of everyone who could live at
some time. It is not a gathering of all actual or possible persons.
To conceive of the original position in either of these ways is to
stretch fantasy too far; the conception would cease to be a natural
guide to intuiti6n. 60
In the same way, the argument has been advanced in this article that
the "Blessings of Liberty to . . . our Posterity" clause is best
interpreted not as directly securing those blessings to all yet-to-be-
born or yet-to-be-conceived members of posterity, but rather as an
interpretive aid, a posited guide to intuition when we are faced with
fundamental questions as to the meaning and scope of basic concepts
set forth in the Constitution.
Rawls never applied his original-position analysis to the specific
problem which is the subject of this article. His major example was
in the area of economic intergenerational justice.61 His words and
his allusions, however, would seem to have implications in many
other contexts:
[I]magining themselves to be fathers, [the justice-seekers] are to
ascertain how much they should set aside for their sons by noting
60. Ibid, p. 139.
61. Ibid., pp. 284-93.
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what they would believe themselves entitled to claim of their
fathers .62
If justice-seekers are to put themselves hypothetically in the position
of Rawls' yet-to-be-born sons for the purpose of devising economic
principles which will be fair to the next generation, it would seem
an a fortiori point to suggest that a similar hypothetical positioning
is warranted when the principle at issue is life itself. Rawls' approach
to intergenerational justice has been critiqued. 63 It and approaches
like it have, however, proven useful in theses concerning protection
of the environment, economic waste, and other phenomena affecting
yet-to-be-born people. 4
VI. CONCLUSION
In recognizing the right to privacy in the abortion decision on
terms so broad as to amount to a virtually unlimited right to abortion
on demand, the Roe decision, it would seem, has failed to secure
the blessings of liberty to a portion of our posterity. Some might be
inclined to argue that the Roe decision has deprived a portion of
our posterity of the inalienable right to life. In light of the legislative
history of the "Blessings of Liberty . . . to our Posterity" clause,
both propositions would seem to be tenable. To some, of course,
neither proposition will seem persuasive. What cannot be gainsaid,
however, is that the Roe decision neglected one small bit of relevant
input, i.e., the fact that we, the people, ordained and established the
Constitution not only to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves,
but also to secure those very same blessings to our posterity. 65 Our
62. Ibid., p. 289.
63. See Richard A. Epstein, "Justice Across the Generations," 67 Tex. L. Rev.
(1989), pp. 1465, 1466.
64. "The Interests of Posterity in the Constitutional Scheme," pp. 113, 125,
and authorities cited therein.
65. Thomas Paine, no stranger to the use of the word "posterity" (he used it
ten times in his 1776 pamphlet Common Sense), once captured the sensibility behind
a people's orientation towards posterity, albeit in a different context and at an
earlier time, when he retold the following anecdote:
I once felt that kind of anger, which a man ought to feel, against the mean
principles that are held by the tories: A noted one, who kept a tavern at
Amboy, was standing at his door, with as pretty a child in his hand, about
eight or nine years old, as I ever saw, and after speaking his mind as freely as
he thought was prudent, finished with this unfatherly expression, "Well, give
me peace in my day." Not a man lives on the continent but fully believes that
a separation must some time or other finally take place, and a generous parent
should have said, "If there must be trouble, let it be in my own day, that my
child may have peace"; and this single reflection, well applied, is sufficient to
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Constitution proclaims itself to be posterity-oriented. We, in that
Constitution, have proclaimed ourselves to be a posterity-oriented
people. The problem with the Roe decision from a positivist perspective
is that, at best, it failed to take that textually specific posterity
orientation into account; at worst, it denied it. In either case the
Roe decision is wanting.
If Roe is to be overturned, the decision overturning it will almost
certainly be positivist in tone, i.e., confined to fair interpretations
of the concepts and principles announced in the Constitution itself.
If, beyond being positivist in tone, it is also thorough in scope and
takes into account the Constitution's expressed value orientation
towards posterity's enjoyment of the blessings of liberty, it may be
a pro-life decision as well.
awaken every man to duty.
Thomas Paine, The Crisis, Number I (1776), reprinted in Thomas Paine, Political
Writings (Bruce Kulick, ed. 1989), pp. 44, 45 (emphasis in original).

